Structured Analytical Report: South Korea-Taiwan Cooperation on US Chip Tariffs

South Korea’s Trade Minister Yeo Han-koo stated on November 24, 2025, that there is room for cooperation with Taiwan on U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed semiconductor tariffs. This comes after South Korea finalized a trade deal with the U.S. that includes a clause ensuring South Korea receives tariff terms no less favorable than those offered to Taiwan (a key competitor). However, Taiwan’s Premier Cho Jung-tai denied any information about such cooperation on November 25, noting Taiwan is only negotiating directly with the U.S. Additionally, U.S. officials have hinted at delaying the long-promised semiconductor tariffs, a centerpiece of Trump’s economic agenda. South Korea’s semiconductor exports to the U.S. rose 51.2% to $1.2 billion in October 2025, increasing its exposure to potential tariffs.

a. South Korea’s trade minister sees potential for cooperation with Taiwan on U.S. chip tariffs [1].
b. South Korea’s U.S. trade deal links its tariff terms to those offered to Taiwan [1].
c. Taiwan denies cooperation talks with South Korea, stating negotiations are exclusive to the U.S. [2].
d. U.S. officials may delay semiconductor tariffs [1,2].
e. South Korea’s semiconductor exports to the U.S. grew 51.2% in October 2025 [1].

South Korea’s trade deal with the U.S. includes a clause that ties its tariff terms to Taiwan’s. This creates an incentive for South Korea to cooperate with Taiwan: if Taiwan secures more favorable tariff terms, South Korea wants to ensure it can match those terms to remain competitive in the U.S. market [1]. The 51.2% growth in South Korea’s semiconductor exports to the U.S. in October further amplifies this motivation, as tariffs would directly impact this growing revenue stream [1].

Taiwan’s denial of cooperation talks suggests it prefers to maintain direct control over its tariff negotiations with the U.S. Avoiding joint talks with South Korea allows Taiwan to prioritize its own interests without potential compromises or complications from a third party [2].

The rumored delay in U.S. tariffs gives both South Korea and Taiwan additional time to negotiate favorable terms. However, it also introduces uncertainty about the final tariff structure, which could influence long-term investment decisions in the semiconductor industry [1,2].

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is expanding its capacity in Taiwan (planning three new factories) and developing its 2nm process [3,4]. These investments are independent of tariff negotiations but could be impacted by the final tariff outcomes, as they shape the cost of exporting to the U.S. market.

• Uncertainty
  : The conflicting signals from South Korea and Taiwan may lead to cautious investor sentiment in semiconductor stocks (e.g., TSM).
• Relief
  : The potential delay in U.S. tariffs provides temporary relief for companies exporting chips to the U.S., including TSMC and South Korean firms like Samsung [1,2].

• Cooperation Outcome
  : If cooperation between South Korea and Taiwan materializes, it could lead to more favorable tariff terms for both regions, reducing export costs and boosting competitiveness. However, Taiwan’s current stance makes this uncertain [1,2].
• Negotiation Progress
  : Taiwan’s direct negotiations with the U.S. may result in tailored tariff terms that align with its industry’s needs, while South Korea will monitor these outcomes to leverage its trade deal clause [1,2].

• Supply Chain Shifts
  : The final tariff structure will influence global semiconductor supply chain dynamics, including investment decisions (e.g., TSMC’s factory expansions) and technology development (e.g., 2nm process adoption) [3,4].
• Competitive Landscape
  : Favorable tariff terms could strengthen the position of Taiwanese and South Korean semiconductor firms in the U.S. market, while unfavorable terms may push them to diversify export destinations.

• South Korea’s Trade Deal Clause
  : Ensures no less favorable tariff terms than Taiwan [1].
• Taiwan’s Negotiation Strategy
  : Exclusive direct talks with the U.S. [2].
• U.S. Tariff Delay
  : Potential postponement of a key Trump economic policy [1,2].
• Industry Trends
  : TSMC’s capacity expansion and 2nm process development are ongoing [3,4].
• Export Growth
  : South Korea’s U.S. semiconductor exports grew 51.2% in October 2025 [1].

a. Specific details of the U.S. chip tariff proposal (e.g., tariff rates, product scope).
b. Exact demands and progress of Taiwan’s direct negotiations with the U.S.
c. Behind-the-scenes discussions between South Korea and Taiwan (if any) not disclosed by Taiwan’s premier.
d. Timeline for the U.S. decision on tariff implementation or delay.
e. Impact of tariff negotiations on real-time semiconductor stock prices (no data available).
f. Relevance of tickers SSNGY and HXSCL (no recent news found for these symbols).

[0] Ginlix InfoFlow Analytical Database: Market and Industry Analysis Data
[1] Reuters. “South Korea sees room for cooperation with Taiwan on US chip tariffs, trade minister says”. November 24, 2025. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-sees-room-cooperation-with-taiwan-us-chip-tariffs-trade-minister-2025-11-24/
[2] Reuters. “Taiwan says ‘no information’ on cooperation with South Korea on US chip tariffs”. November 25, 2025. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-says-no-information-cooperation-with-south-korea-us-chip-tariffs-2025-11-25/
[3] Gurufocus. “TSMC (TSM) Plans to Build Three New Factories in Taiwan”. November 25, 2025. URL: https://www.gurufocus.com/news/3223077/tsmc-tsm-plans-to-build-three-new-factories-in-taiwan
[4] Wccftech. “TSMC’s 2nm N2 Process Rumored To Have Limited Power, Performance & Area Improvements”. November 24, 2025. URL: https://wccftech.com/tsmcs-2nm-n2-ppa-improvements-to-be-limited/

Note: Tickers SSNGY and HXSCL returned no relevant stories, indicating they may not be active or have no recent news related to the topic.

This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
All data is sourced from the tools provided and cited accordingly.
Last updated: November 25, 2025.