Analysis of the Impact of Debang Co., Ltd.'s (603056.SH) Voluntary Delisting on Minority Shareholders' Interests

Based on collected materials, I will systematically analyze the impact of Debang Co., Ltd.'s voluntary delisting on the interests of minority shareholders.

---

On January 13, 2026, Debang Co., Ltd. (603056.SH) issued an announcement stating that, upon the proposal of its indirect controlling shareholder Suqian JD Zhuofeng Enterprise Management Co., Ltd. (JD Zhuofeng), the company plans to voluntarily withdraw its A-shares from trading on the Shanghai Stock Exchange via a shareholders’ meeting resolution. This is the first A-listed company to propose voluntary delisting in 2026[1][2].

---

Comparison Dimension	Debang Co., Ltd.'s Proposal	Historical A-share Average
Cash Option Exercise Price	RMB 19.00 per share	—
Pre-Suspension Closing Price	RMB 14.04 per share	—
30-Trading-Day Average Price	RMB 14.00 per share	—
Premium Rate	Approximately 35.71%	2%-10% [2]

The tender offer price corresponds to a company market value of over RMB 19 billion, representing a premium of 35.3% over the pre-suspension market price, which is significantly higher than the 2%-10% average premium rate of historical voluntary delisting transactions in the A-share market[2].

• Rational Regression of Industry Valuation
  : The overall valuation of the logistics industry is currently under pressure, with the market assigning a low valuation level[2]
• Exit Certainty Premium
  : Provides a definite exit channel for minority shareholders, avoiding the risk of mandatory delisting
• Reflection of JD Logistics’ Sincerity
  : As a strategic integration within the JD Logistics system, the controlling party is willing to pay a higher premium

---

Yu Yao, Assistant Professor at the School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, pointed out that Debang Co., Ltd.'s proposal adopts a “high-configuration mode” of

, which effectively balances the interest game between controlling shareholders and minority investors[1].

The delisting must meet the

requirements:

• Approval by
  more than 2/3 of the valid voting rights held by all shareholders
  present at the shareholders’ meeting
• Approval by
  more than 2/3 of the valid voting rights held by other shareholders excluding major shareholders, directors, supervisors and senior executives
  present at the shareholders’ meeting[1][3]

“This clause essentially grants minority shareholders a ‘collective veto right’ over the delisting, avoiding the risk of forced delisting by leveraging shareholding advantages.”[1]

• Coverage Scope
  : All A-share shareholders, including dissenting shareholders (excluding restricted shares or shares with right restrictions)[1]
• Exercise Method
  : A non-mandatory transaction; shareholders can freely choose to accept or reject, and can also choose to declare all or part of their shares[1][4]
• Record Date
  : February 6, 2026[1][4]

• After delisting, the company will continue to trade on the
  Delisted Board of the National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ)
  , retaining a certain level of liquidity[1]
• The company’s assets, personnel, and business will not be adversely affected, and it will maintain its independent brand and operations[1][4]

---

1. Opportunity for Excess Returns
   • Exercising the option at RMB 19 per share yields a premium return of approximately 35% over the market price
   • For long-term holding minority shareholders, this is a rare certain return

2. Unimpeded Exit Channel
   • The cash option can be exercised regardless of whether shareholders vote in favor, against, or abstain
   • Avoids the risk of liquidity depletion after mandatory delisting

3. Substantial Protection of Voting Rights
   • The classified voting mechanism ensures that minority shareholders’ opinions are fully respected
   • Prevents “one-man rule” delisting decisions by major shareholders

1. Inability to Relist
   • The company currently has
     no relisting plans
     [1][4]
   • After delisting, it will become a non-listed company, with a significant decline in share liquidity

2. Company Performance Pressure
   • The 2025 third quarterly report shows that the company recorded a net loss attributable to parent shareholders of RMB 277 million in the first three quarters, representing a year-on-year decrease of 153.54%[4]
   • After delisting, there is no requirement to disclose periodic reports, leading to reduced information transparency

3. Choice of Exercising or Not Exercising the Option
   • If shareholders choose not to exercise the option and continue holding shares, they must accept the liquidity discount after delisting
   • If shareholders choose to exercise the option, they will completely exit their investment

---

“Overall, within the existing regulatory framework, this is a voluntary delisting case with relatively complete protection clauses and is relatively friendly to minority shareholders.”[1]

• Stock Price Performance
  : On January 14, after resuming trading, the stock hit a full-day limit-up, closing at RMB 15.44 per share with an increase of 9.97%[3][4]
• Capital Flow
  : As of the close on January 14, the main capital net inflow was RMB 24.5091 million, a new high since June 24, 2025[3]

---

Dimension	Evaluation
Premium Level	★★★★★ Significantly higher than historical average, full of sincerity
Voting Mechanism	★★★★★ Classified voting protects minority shareholders’ rights and interests
Liquidity Arrangements	★★★★☆ Trading on the delisted board retains a certain exit channel
Information Transparency	★★☆☆☆ Reduced information disclosure requirements after delisting
Overall Friendliness	★★★★☆ A relatively friendly voluntary delisting case

1. Actively Participate in Voting
   : Cherish the right to classified voting and fully express your stance on the delisting proposal
2. Rationally Choose to Exercise the Option
   : Decide whether to exercise the cash option based on your own investment horizon and risk preference
3. Follow Subsequent Announcements
   : Closely track the company’s specific arrangements for cash option declaration

This voluntary delisting case of Debang Co., Ltd. sets a good example in terms of procedural compliance and investor protection, reflecting the formation trend of a sound “orderly entry and exit” ecosystem in the A-share market.

---

[1] Eastmoney.com - “First Case of the New Year! Debang Co., Ltd.'s Proposed Voluntary Delisting is Relatively Friendly to Minority Shareholders” (https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202601143618966372.html)

[2] Securities Times Network - “Debang Co., Ltd. Delisting: Strategic Choice and Win-Win for Shareholders’ Interests, Tender Offer Premium Exceeds 35%” (https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/3590666.html)

[3] Sina Finance - “Debang Co., Ltd. Proposes Voluntary Delisting, Hits Full-Day Limit-Up After Resuming Trading, Exercise Price Carries 35% Premium Over Pre-Suspension Price” (https://cj.sina.cn/articles/view/2023821012/78a10ed402001rwn0)

[4] Securities Times Network - “Stock Price Opens at Limit-Up! Debang Co., Ltd. Proposes Voluntary Delisting” (https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/3591761.html)