Analysis of Geopolitical Risks and Strategic Investment in Greenland's Rare Earth Resources

Based on the latest collected information, I will conduct a systematic analysis from three dimensions: geopolitics, resource strategy, and investment impact.

As the world’s largest island, Greenland is home to strategically valuable mineral resources beneath its surface:

• Greenland’s rare earth reserves (1.5 million tonnes) ≈ U.S. mainland (1.9 million tonnes) [1]
• Surpasses Canada (830,000 tonnes) and South Africa (860,000 tonnes)
• It is the only global rare earth resource-rich region that can rival China and the U.S.

Greenland’s strategic value is reflected not only in its resources but also in its unique geographical location:

1. Shipping Lane Hub
   : Connects the Arctic, Canada’s Northwest Passage, and the North Atlantic Passage; it is the shortest air route from North America to Europe and Russia [1]
2. Military Fortress
   : The U.S. has established the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) on the island to monitor activities in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans [2]
3. GIUK Gap
   : A strategic waterway for monitoring the naval movements of other countries [2]

According to the latest intelligence, the Trump administration’s ambitions regarding Greenland have moved from “strategic planning” to the “implementation phase” [2]:

• National security and military considerations (countering Russian Arctic expansion)
• Control of critical minerals (reducing dependence on China)
• Control of shipping lanes (the commercial value of Arctic shipping lanes has become prominent)

Under the framework of international law, possible options include [2]:

• 85% of Greenlanders explicitly oppose becoming part of the U.S. [2]
• NATO alliance relations could end as a result [2]
• Denmark, as a NATO member, is protected by the collective defense mechanism

The current global mining supply chain is undergoing a “pan-security” transformation [3]. Geopolitical risks in Greenland will accelerate this trend:

• Established an exclusive mining alliance through the Inflation Reduction Act
• Signed a priority access agreement for copper, cobalt, and lithium with the Democratic Republic of the Congo [3]
• Signed a priority mining rights agreement for rare earths and lithium with Ukraine

• Implemented export controls on rare earth-related technologies and items in October 2025 [3]
• Implemented targeted export controls on dual-use items to Japan in January 2026 [4]
• Strengthened “endogenous capacity building” and international cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Global Rare Earth Supply Chain Dependence Map                    │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Resource Segment: China (60%+) | Greenland (Potential) | Australia | Vietnam     │
│  Processing Segment: China (90%+) | U.S. (5%) | Japan (3%) | Others     │
│  Refining Segment: China (Dual Monopoly) | High Technical Barriers | Difficult to Replicate   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Core Vulnerability: China controls both resources and processing technologies, forming a "dual monopoly" [5]  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Geopolitical risks in Greenland are reshaping the global rare earth investment landscape:

• Signed an executive order in March 2025 to mobilize Department of Defense resources to build a rare earth processing plant [5]
• The Department of Energy allocated $134 million for rare earth recycling projects
• Companies such as MP Materials launched domestic mining projects (but refining still needs to be outsourced)

• South Korea’s Korea Zinc invested in a rare earth refinery in Tennessee (creating over 700 jobs)
• The EU and Japan are seeking rare earth supply diversification
• Chinese enterprises are accelerating technology integration and overseas layout

• Chinese rare earth enterprises benefit from premiums brought by export controls
• Investment opportunities related to the substitution effect of Japanese and EU suppliers
• U.S. domestic rare earth processing enterprises (driven by defense orders)

• International capital involvement in Greenland’s resource development
• African rare earth projects (Congo, Namibia, etc.)
• R&D of alternative technologies (reducing rare earth dependence)

1. Resource Control: Accounts for over 60% of global rare earth production
2. Processing Monopoly: Meets 90% of global processing demand [5]
3. Technical Barriers: Masters core separation and purification technologies (solvent extraction method)
4. Policy Tools: Achieves targeted countermeasures through export controls

1. The U.S. is building a “friendshoring supply chain” to exclude China
2. Geopolitical risks in Greenland and other regions bring supply chain uncertainty
3. The “pan-security” trend of the global industrial chain is accelerating

China's Rare Earth Strategic Response Framework
├── Defensive Countermeasures
│   ├── Maintain rare earth export control policy tools
│   ├── Precisely target military-related uses
│   └── Safeguard rights and interests using international rules such as the WTO
│
├── Endogenous Capacity Building
│   ├── Increase R&D in advanced rare earth processing technologies
│   ├── Promote rare earth recycling and reuse
│   └── Cultivate domestic rare earth application industries
│
└── Deepening International Cooperation
    ├── Rely on the Belt and Road platform
    ├── Deepen resource cooperation with African countries
    └── Promote the "de-weaponization" of the global supply chain

1. Geopolitical risks in Greenland are a catalyst for the restructuring of the global mining supply chain
   , which will accelerate competition among major powers in the field of critical minerals.

2. The strategic attribute of rare earth resources has become more prominent
   ; they are no longer ordinary commodities but core strategic assets for national security.

3. The “dual monopoly” pattern is difficult to change in the short term
   — China’s dominant position in resources and processing faces long-term challenges from the U.S.'s “friendshoring supply chain” strategy.

4. Investment risks and opportunities coexist
   ; close attention should be paid to geopolitical evolution, policy trends, and supply chain changes.

• The U.S. expands its influence in Greenland through diplomatic and economic pressure
• Greenland remains nominally under Danish sovereignty but is effectively controlled by the U.S.
• The global rare earth supply chain is gradually diversified, and price volatility intensifies

• The international community effectively curbs the U.S.'s aggressive actions
• Greenland maintains the status quo, and a compromise is reached within NATO
• The rare earth supply chain is stable, and investment risks are manageable

• The U.S. takes military or paramilitary actions
• Major divisions emerge within NATO
• The global supply chain undergoes drastic restructuring, and trade frictions intensify

[1] National Business Daily - “The US Seizes Maduro and Targets Greenland: What’s Its Agenda?” (https://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2026-01-10/4214843.html)

[2] China Business Network - “Trump Threatens to ‘Annex’ Greenland: Six Scenario Simulations” (https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2026-01-08/doc-inhfqcav3984267.shtml)

[3] Cultural Perspectives - “How Does the US Weaponize Critical Minerals? What Should China Do?” (https://www.wenxuecity.com/news/2026/01/10/126483165.html)

[4] Sohu - “China’s Rare Earth Ace is Played! Japanese Stock Market Crashes” (https://q.stock.sohu.com/cn/news.html?textId=966512616)

[5] NetEase News - “Trump Orders the US Military to Smelt Rare Earths and Discovers a Fatal Truth” (https://www.163.com/dy/article/KJ3KR73T05563IC9.html)