In-Depth Research Report on Widespread Price Increases and Consumer Scene Segmentation in the Down Jacket Industry

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In 2025, China’s down jacket market is undergoing unprecedented price restructuring. According to data from the China National Garment Association, in the first three quarters of 2025, against the backdrop of a 6.21% decline in overall output of the garment industry, down jacket output achieved a counter-trend growth of 6.21%, with the market scale expected to exceed RMB 250 billion[1][2]. This data indicates that down jackets have evolved from simple seasonal warm clothing items to a “perennial staple” in the consumer market, showing anti-cyclical growth resilience.

From a historical perspective, the down jacket market scale was less than RMB 100 billion in 2017, and rose to nearly RMB 200 billion in 2023, with a compound annual growth rate of over 15%. However, this growth did not come from linear expansion of sales volume, but was mainly driven by the upward shift of the price center. Taking Bosideng as an example, its average sales price on Tmall increased from RMB 183 in 2017 to RMB 847 in 2025, a surge of 363%; on JD.com, it rose from about RMB 500 to RMB 1080[3]. Such a price jump has become a common phenomenon in the industry, with mainstream brands seeing a widespread price hike of around 30%.

The continuous rise in the price of down raw materials forms the underlying logic of down jacket price hikes. According to monitoring data from Down Gold Network, taking 90% white duck down as an example, the quotation on January 9, 2026 reached RMB 527.72 per kilogram, with a 7-day increase of 3.09%, up about 16.38% compared to the same period in previous years[3][4]. From a broader perspective, between 2022 and 2025, the price of 90% down surged from RMB 200,000-300,000 per ton to RMB 570,000-600,000 per ton, more than doubling[5].

This cost pressure is transmitted layer by layer in the industrial chain. According to industry estimates, in the first three quarters of 2025, the proportion of raw material costs in down jacket ex-factory costs rose from 62% last year to 68%[1]. Taking a short down jacket with 200g down filling as an example: if duck down priced at RMB 500,000 per ton is used, the down cost is about RMB 100; if goose down priced at RMB 1,000,000 per ton is used, the cost rises to RMB 200, a cost difference of RMB 100 for the whole garment. Adding processing fees ranging from RMB 50 to 100 and fabric and accessory costs, the cost of a qualified duck down jacket is between RMB 200 and 250, while that of a goose down jacket is around RMB 300 to 350[5].

The price difference between goose down and duck down stems from the fundamental difference in growth cycles. Geese generally require a growth cycle of more than half a year (still 80 to 100 days after industrialized breeding), while ducks can be slaughtered in only 40 days. This difference in supply elasticity makes duck down prices more sensitive to changes in demand. In addition, speculation in the source market has further exacerbated price fluctuations, with some traders hoarding feather raw materials to artificially create a tight supply-demand situation[5].

In addition to raw material costs, high channel operation costs have also pushed up terminal pricing. In the e-commerce era, traffic costs have become one of the largest expenses for brand operations. According to industry practitioners, the promotion traffic costs for high unit price products on platforms are extremely high, reaching up to RMB 100-200 per piece, and once returns occur, the cost is completely lost[5]. This mechanism forces brands to increase pricing to cover channel risk costs.

At the same time, head brands continue to increase investment in marketing. Between fiscal years 2018 and 2024, Bosideng’s sales and distribution expenses surged from RMB 2.452 billion to RMB 8.055 billion, with a compound annual growth rate of 21.92%, far exceeding the 17.37% compound annual growth rate of revenue in the same period[6]. In the first half of fiscal year 2025 (six months), this expense reached as high as RMB 2.275 billion. This means that if a consumer purchases a RMB 2,000 Bosideng down jacket, about RMB 800 of it is actually paying for celebrity endorsements, red carpet shows, advertising and marketing, etc.[6].

Bosideng’s premiumization transformation began in 2018, when the company faced a severe brand aging crisis. The failed diversified expansion in 2016 led to a halving of revenue, inventory backlog, and net profit dropped from RMB 1 billion to just over RMB 100 million[6]. Chairman Gao Dekang proposed the strategy of “focusing on the main business and contracting diversification”, officially launching the second entrepreneurship with premiumization as the core.

In the early stage of transformation, Bosideng adopted a series of aggressive market measures. Starting from 2018, the brand made high-profile appearances at international fashion weeks in New York, Milan, Paris, etc., collaborated with top international designers on co-branded collections, and signed with traffic celebrities such as Yang Mi, Xiao Zhan, and Eileen Gu, trying to reshape the brand tone through intensive marketing[6][7]. This strategy achieved remarkable results in the short term, with brand awareness greatly enhanced and the price range significantly shifted upward.

From the perspective of price evolution, in 2017, Bosideng’s average tag price was about RMB 1,000, focusing on the mass budget market; after 2018, the price increase exceeded 30%, and the average transaction price approached RMB 2,000; by 2025, the brand’s main price range has been anchored at RMB 1,500-2,500[7][8]. Some products even jumped from the thousand-yuan range to the ten-thousand-yuan range, such as the “Summit 2.0” series with a maximum price of RMB 14,800[6].

In the layout of high-end product lines, Bosideng has shown strong ambition. In 2025, the brand collaborated with top international designer Kim Jones to launch the high-end product line Bosideng AREAL series, priced between RMB 2,399 and RMB 3,999; currently, the highest single product price in official stores has reached RMB 6,999[1][7]. This price range has touched the ceiling of domestic down jackets, approaching international second- and third-tier luxury brands.

The earlier launched “Summit” series has pushed prices to the ten-thousand-yuan level. The “Summit 1.0” series was priced over RMB 10,000 in 2019, and the “Summit 2.0” series had a maximum price of RMB 14,800 in 2021[6]. Together with segmented series such as “Extreme Cold”, “Puffer”, and “High-End Outdoor”, Bosideng has built a multi-level product matrix covering the thousand-yuan to ten-thousand-yuan range, trying to meet the needs of different consumption tiers and scenarios.

In terms of international layout, Bosideng has also taken frequent actions. In 2021, it established a joint venture with German luxury sports brand Bogner, introducing its main brand BOGNER and sub-brand FIRE+ICE; in 2024, it made a strategic investment in Canadian luxury down jacket brand Moose Knuckles, with a shareholding ratio of over 30%[7]. These measures show Bosideng’s intention to accelerate the acquisition of high-end brand genes through capital operations.

Although Bosideng has achieved a leap-forward breakthrough in price range, its brand premiumization process still faces structural obstacles. First, the mass brand background is difficult to eliminate in the short term. On e-commerce platforms, Bosideng’s main brand products with higher monthly sales are still concentrated in the mid-to-low price range of RMB 300-1,000, while the sales of higher-priced products are relatively sluggish[6]. This indicates that consumers’ acceptance of Bosideng’s prices still stays in the cost-effective range, and the brand’s premium capability has not yet been fully recognized by the market.

Second, there is an obvious mismatch between channel layout and high-end positioning. As of September 30, 2025, among Bosideng’s more than 3,500 regular retail stores nationwide, about 67.2% are located in third- and fourth-tier cities, while only 32.8% are in first- and second-tier cities[3][6]. This channel structure contradicts the current situation that high-end consumer groups are concentrated in top business districts of first-tier cities. In the current era of “scenario equals brand promotion”, store locations directly affect brand image building, and Bosideng’s premiumization narrative lacks sufficient support from high-end scenarios.

Third, the scenario penetration in the high-end market is insufficient. Compared with competitors such as Moncler, Arc’teryx, and Canada Goose, which carry out refined operations for segmented crowd scenarios — Moncler focuses on high-end skiing and social scenarios, Arc’teryx focuses on high-altitude climbing and extreme sports, and Canada Goose serves the middle class for long-distance travel and high-latitude urban life — Bosideng still lacks a clear high-end scenario positioning[6]. As industry analysts point out, to break through the price barrier of RMB 3,000 and above, it is difficult to impress high-end consumers only by technological functions and co-branding effects; it is also necessary to inject luxury texture, brand stories and unique design aesthetics.

From the perspective of financial data, Bosideng’s growth momentum has shown signs of slowing down. According to its financial report, in the 2024/25 fiscal year (as of March 31, 2025), the overall revenue reached RMB 25.902 billion, a year-on-year increase of 11.6%; the net profit attributable to shareholders was RMB 3.514 billion, a year-on-year increase of 14.5%[8]. However, according to the research report of China Minsheng Bank International, Bosideng’s revenue growth rates in fiscal years 2024 and 2025 were 38% and 12% respectively, and the revenue growth rates in the first half of fiscal years 2025 and 2026 were 18% and 1% respectively, showing a significant downward trend[7].

Specifically for Bosideng’s main brand, its revenue growth rate dropped from 43% in fiscal year 2024 to 10% in fiscal year 2025, with the latest half-year growth rate being 8%, compared with 19% in the same period of the previous year[7]. The performance of sub-brands is also under pressure: Xuezhongfei’s revenue in the first half of fiscal year 2025/26 was RMB 378 million, a year-on-year decrease of 3.2%, and the gross profit margin fell to 47.9%; Bingjie’s revenue was only RMB 15 million, a sharp drop of 26.1%[6]. These data indicate that the marginal benefits of premiumization transformation are diminishing, and the brand urgently needs to find a new growth engine.

Against the backdrop of collective price hikes of brand down jackets, warehouse membership supermarkets have emerged as dark horses with cost-effective strategies, becoming the “price catfish” in the down jacket market. In the winter of 2025, the long down jacket with 400g down filling priced at RMB 499.9 in Sam’s Club triggered a buying spree, with many stores out of stock, and customer service said the restocking time was unknown[9]. Pangdonglai’s self-owned Kashi Gao down jacket is priced at RMB 528, which also experienced a one-month out-of-stock period, and restocking was only completed on January 1, 2026[9].

The core competitiveness of these budget products lies in their ultra-high cost performance. Taking Sam’s Club’s RMB 499 duck down model as an example, industry estimates show that its cost is about RMB 350, with a gross profit margin of only over 30%, far lower than the gross profit margin of at least 50% of traditional clothing brands[9]. Pangdonglai’s gross profit margin control is even stricter: the gross profit margin of regular-priced products is in the range of 10% to 28.5%, locally procured products are not higher than 23.5%, and directly sourced products are not higher than 28.5%[9]. This “low gross profit, high turnover” pricing strategy is in sharp contrast to the several times markup of traditional clothing brands.

The price advantage of Sam’s Club and Pangdonglai stems from their unique supply chain model innovation. Traditional clothing brands adopt the “futures system” procurement model, which requires placing orders for production half a year in advance, with a huge single production batch (hundreds of thousands of pieces at a time), which is prone to inventory backlog. Sam’s Club adopts the “spot system” procurement model, selecting products from existing suppliers, putting forward personalized requirements (such as 400g down filling), negotiating prices and placing small trial orders (such as 200 pieces), with a production cycle of about 7 to 10 days, plus the logistics link, it only takes half a month from order placement to shelf listing[9].

The core advantages of this model are reflected in three aspects: first, the selected versions are all mature styles verified in the market, with no design risks; second, only basic color products such as black, white, and gray are procured, without fancy styles, making it easier to achieve 100% sell-through to avoid inventory losses; third, small trial orders reduce inventory risks and can quickly respond to changes in market demand[9]. Industry insiders pointed out that “efficiency” is the core competitive barrier of such warehouse membership supermarkets, and traditional brands cannot copy this model due to their large number of stores (thousands).

The main buyers of Sam’s Club down jackets are pragmatic white-collar women aged 30 to 45[9]. This group has the following consumption characteristics: tired of the tedious operation of comparing prices across the entire network and identifying quality; trusting the selection standards of Sam’s Club and Pangdonglai; paying attention to hard indicators such as product warmth and down filling amount; pursuing high cost performance, mostly pragmatic consumers.

Consumers’ recognition of such products stems from their trust in the selection ability of the membership supermarket brands. As Zhang Yi, CEO of iiMedia Research, said, based on their recognition of the selection standards of Sam’s Club and Pangdonglai, consumers believe that their product quality is guaranteed, and even if they are “white-label” products under OEM or order models, they will have natural trust in them[9]. In the current era of increasingly parameterized and data-driven down jacket consumption (54% of consumers will focus on specific parameters such as down filling amount, fluffiness, and cleanliness when purchasing), supermarkets use transparent operation models and information disclosure mechanisms to break the information asymmetry of traditional retail, providing consumers with a trust basis for “buying without hesitation”.

The popularity of supermarket budget down jackets has formed a dual squeeze on traditional brands. Upward, the price threshold of international luxury brands and domestic high-end brands keeps ordinary consumers out; downward, white-label products and low-price markets achieve ultra-low price competition through cutting corners. Mid-tier brands in the middle ground, such as Tanboer and Yaya, face the embarrassing dilemma of “unable to support premiums due to insufficient upward brand power, and unable to compete with white-label products in terms of downward cost”[5].

An industry insider who operates a down jacket brand in Pinghu, Zhejiang, said frankly: “There are some low-end counterfeit products pushing up from below, claiming to be goose down at RMB 399 or RMB 499; from above, e-commerce models of big brands such as Bosideng and Tanboer are also reducing prices to attract users. The living space for our mid-tier brands is getting smaller”[5]. This pattern of “both ends squeezing the middle tier” is reshaping the competitive landscape of the entire industry.

The current down jacket market has formed a clear pyramid structure:

: International luxury brands represented by Moncler and Canada Goose, with prices generally around RMB 10,000 or even hundreds of thousands of yuan. Moncler’s revenue in the first three quarters was 1.553 billion euros, a year-on-year decrease of 1% at the current exchange rate, showing sluggish growth in the high-end market[7].

: Bosideng’s “Summit” series, Gaofan’s Black Gold Goose Down series, etc., priced in the range of RMB 3,000 to RMB 10,000. This is the most crowded price range, gathering domestic brands trying to break into the high-end market and consumers seeking “luxury brand alternatives”.

: Bosideng’s main brand’s core price range, Gaofan’s core product lines, and cross-border products of some international sports brands. This segment has the fiercest competition, and it is difficult for brands to achieve differentiation.

: The main battlefield of brands such as Xuezhongfei, Yaya, and Yalu, which is also the core coverage area of the sub-thousand-yuan market (accounting for about 72%) on e-commerce platforms[3].

: White-label products from warehouse supermarkets such as Sam’s Club and Pangdonglai, as well as a large number of white-label products and live-streaming e-commerce products. This segment is becoming the first choice for price-sensitive consumers.

Down jacket consumption is evolving from pure functional demand to scene-based and value-oriented directions. Consumers’ evaluation standards for down jackets have become increasingly data-driven and parameterized, with 54% of consumers focusing on specific parameters such as down filling amount, fluffiness, and cleanliness when purchasing[5]. At the same time, consumers’ attention to design and appearance is also increasing, and down jackets are transforming from warm clothing items to fashion items related to a stylish lifestyle.

The consumption scenarios targeted by different brands are highly segmented: luxury fashion down jackets represented by Moncler are mainly used in high-end ski vacations and social activities; outdoor down jackets represented by Arc’teryx and Kailas serve more people engaged in extreme sports such as high-altitude climbing and ski exploration; Canada Goose focuses on scenarios such as winter long-distance travel and high-latitude urban life for the middle class[6]. This refined scene division provides a direction for brands to conduct differentiated competition.

High-end consumer groups (annual income above RMB 500,000) pay attention to brand symbolic value, social attributes and quality assurance, have low price sensitivity, and are willing to pay a premium for international brands. This group accounts for about 10% of the market, but contributes about 30% of the sales[1].

Middle-class consumer groups (annual income of RMB 200,000-500,000) are the core battlefield of brand competition. They pursue a balance of “quality but not luxury”, paying attention to both functional performance and cost performance. This group accounts for about 30% of the market, and is the main target customer group of Bosideng’s premiumization transformation.

Mass consumer groups (annual income below RMB 200,000) have high price sensitivity, limited acceptance of brand premiums, and pay more attention to actual warmth effects. This group accounts for about 60% of the market, and is the main audience of hundred-yuan budget products.

It is worth noting that consumer stratification is not a simple linear corresponding relationship. The same consumer may show completely different purchase behaviors in different scenarios: they tend to choose cost-effective products for daily commuting, but may purchase high-end brands for important social occasions. This “scene-switching consumption” provides brands with opportunities for precise marketing.

In the ultra-high-end market above RMB 10,000, Moncler and Canada Goose still occupy a dominant position, but their growth momentum has obviously slowed down. Canada Goose’s year-on-year revenue growth rates in fiscal years 2023-2025 were 10.8%, 9.6%, and 1.1% respectively, and in the second quarter of fiscal year 2026, it turned from profit to loss, with an operating loss of CAD 17.6 million[7]. Moncler Group achieved revenue of 1.841 billion euros in the first three quarters of 2025, a year-on-year decrease of 1% at the current exchange rate[7].

Local high-end brands are accelerating their rise. Gaofan has successfully entered the core price range of RMB 1,000-3,000 through focusing on goose down jackets and the “luxury brand alternative” strategy, and is testing higher price ranges. In 2025, Gaofan reached a cooperation with the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL) to jointly build the world’s fourth luxury research center, and carry out joint research and development in core technology fields such as heat storage materials and membrane materials[10]. This measure marks the transformation of local brands from “technology following” to “joint standard research”, trying to compete for discourse power at the top of the industrial chain.

In the mass market of RMB 300-800, traditional brands are facing dual impacts from live-streaming e-commerce and white-label products. Yaya rose through restructuring, youth-oriented strategy and live-streaming e-commerce, with its omnichannel GMV reaching RMB 15-20 billion in 2023[6]. Brands such as Yalu and Tanboer rely on their offline channel advantages to hold onto their market shares.

The rise of live-streaming e-commerce has changed the competition rules of the mass market. E-commerce host Xiao Yimu pointed out that from 2021 to 2023, the GMV of a single 4-hour live stream could reach about RMB 1 million, but by 2025, the market “has slipped sharply”, and a single live stream with GMV exceeding RMB 100,000 is considered normal[5]. The cooling market has made the inventory backlog caused by optimistic forecasts in previous years a sword hanging over many merchants.

White-label products seize the market with extremely low prices, but also bring quality hidden dangers. In order to survive the price war, some merchants adopt means of cutting corners or even passing off inferior goods as high-quality ones. “Selling 50% down as 90% down, and duck down as goose down” and other fraudulent behaviors are repeatedly prohibited, and “glue down” even uses industrial glue to bond crushed feather filaments into clusters, and its warmth retention performance drops significantly after washing[5]. These chaos have exacerbated the information asymmetry in the market, providing differentiated space for branded products.

Outdoor brands such as Arc’teryx, The North Face, and Camel have taken away a lot of young consumers’ winter budgets with their jackets and “3-in-1” down jackets in cross-border competition. Relying on their deep accumulation in professional functional fields and brand tonality, outdoor brands have successfully expanded down jacket consumption from “warmth demand” to “lifestyle expression”, attracting the new generation of consumers who pursue both functionality and fashion.

Kailas’ 5000GT high-end down jacket was sold out during Double 11, showing the competitive strength of outdoor brands in the high-end market[8]. This cross-border competition is reshaping the down jacket market’s