Analysis of the Evolution of Anti-Involution Policies in the Photovoltaic Industry and Their Impact on Corporate Investment Decisions

Based on the latest policy trends and industry information, this report systematically analyzes the changes in anti-involution policies for the photovoltaic industry and their impact on the investment decisions of major silicon material enterprises.

The “anti-involution” initiative in the photovoltaic industry launched in the second half of 2024, and continued to deepen under national-level promotion. In 2025, this issue was included in the key focus areas of national economic work, becoming the core consensus and action program for the industry to get out of its predicament [1][2].

In the past few years, driven by capital frenzy and optimistic demand expectations, the photovoltaic manufacturing sector has experienced unprecedented capacity expansion. As of the second quarter of 2025, the nominal capacity of domestic silicon materials, silicon wafers, solar cells, and photovoltaic modules all exceeded 1200GW, while the global new installed capacity demand was only around 570-630GW, resulting in severe overcapacity. The serious supply-demand imbalance caused the price of polysilicon to plummet from the 2022 peak of CNY 300,000 per ton, breaking through CNY 35,000 per ton by mid-2025, a drop of nearly 90%, which fell below the cash cost line of most enterprises [3].

On December 9, 2025, Beijing Guanghe Qiancheng Technology Co., Ltd. completed industrial and commercial registration in Beijing with a registered capital of CNY 3 billion. The company was co-founded by nine major silicon material giants including Tongwei, GCL, East Hope, Daquan New Energy, Xinte Energy, Asia Silicon, Qinghai Lihao, Xinjiang Goins, and the China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA) [4][5].

At the China Photovoltaic Industry Annual Conference held at the end of 2025, nearly 60 enterprises signed the Industry Self-Discipline Convention 2.0, clarifying the minimum price limit for each link: CNY 51,000 per ton for silicon materials, CNY 1.49 per piece for silicon wafers, CNY 0.334 per W for solar cells, and CNY 0.735 per W for photovoltaic modules [6][7].

Yang Xudong, Director of the Department of Electronic Information, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, stated that in 2026, capacity regulation will be strengthened, management of photovoltaic manufacturing projects will be enhanced, price monitoring mechanisms will be improved, and product quality supervision and spot checks will be intensified [1].

After one year of efforts, the price system of the photovoltaic industry has recovered:

• The average transaction price of N-type high-purity polysilicon feedstock rose from CNY 35,400 per ton in early July 2025 to CNY 53,600 per ton by late November, an increase of over 50% [1]
• In the first three quarters of 2025, the operating revenue of 31 listed companies in the main industrial chain decreased by 16.88% year-on-year, but the decline narrowed quarter by quarter
• In the third quarter, the narrowing of losses was particularly obvious among leading enterprises; industry leaders such as Daquan New Energy and GCL Technology turned profitable in the third quarter [8]

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Tongwei Group holds 30.35% equity in the Guanghe Qiancheng platform through its controlled grandchild company Tongwei Photovoltaic Technology (Emeishan) Co., Ltd., making it the largest shareholder of the platform with a subscribed registered capital of CNY 910.5 million [4][5].

Liu Hanyuan, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tongwei Group, stated that the photovoltaic industry should adhere to production based on demand and guard against overproduction. When the photovoltaic industry develops to a certain stage, there must be redundant capacity to support demand changes; the key is “how to concentrate surplus capacity for rational and coordinated development”. Liu Hanyuan emphasized that more than 95% of the world’s polysilicon capacity is in China, and more than 80% of the capacity is concentrated in 5 Chinese enterprises, so a consensus needs to be reached: “Just like the main gate of a water plant, control the flow of the main gate to balance the supply of subsequent links” [4].

Tongwei Group clearly stated that the top priority of the industry is still to oppose excessive competition and excessive involution, and anti-monopoly will not become the main contradiction in the short term. We should develop as fast as possible in the short term, but high-quality development and a sound ecological system are needed in the long run [4].

Executives of GCL Technology have stated on multiple occasions that the target price of silicon materials should return to CNY 70,000-80,000 per ton. Based on the third-quarter report data of Daquan New Energy, the company has achieved profitability when the sales price is CNY 41.49 per kg (approximately CNY 41,500 per ton); if the sales price of silicon materials reaches CNY 80,000 per ton, it will mean a 100% gross profit margin [6].

GCL Technology holds 16.79% equity in the Guanghe Qiancheng platform through its subsidiary GCL Technology Consulting Services (Suzhou) Co., Ltd. The company adopts a flexible production strategy: the idle capacity has been fully maintained, repaired, and transformed, keeping its cost and quality at the industry-leading level, and the production of each base will be arranged flexibly based on cost advantages in the later stage [9].

Based on its judgment of market trends and product price changes, Daquan New Energy has dynamically adjusted its production plan, and expects its polysilicon output in the fourth quarter to be in the range of 39,500-42,500 tons. The economies of scale brought by increased output and the decrease in fixed costs allocated per unit product are expected to further optimize the unit cost [9].

Daquan New Energy adopts a “sell as much as possible” strategy, keeping its silicon material inventory at a low level to reduce the risk of price declines [9].

In a recent research survey, TBEA stated that significant results have been achieved since the industry association took the lead in promoting polysilicon capacity integration. The market price has rebounded sharply from the low point at the end of June, and has now exceeded CNY 50,000 per ton, effectively improving the operating conditions of the industry [9].

At present, the product quality and cost control of the company’s production bases after resumption of production have reached the advanced level of the industry. The company’s idle capacity has been fully maintained, repaired, and transformed, with cost and quality reaching the level of first-class enterprises; in the later stage, the polysilicon production of each base will be arranged flexibly based on cost advantages [9].

East Hope and Shanghai East Hope New Energy Technology Co., Ltd. hold 11.3% equity in the Guanghe Qiancheng platform. According to market data, the price of East Hope’s N-type dense silicon material remains at CNY 49-51 per kg, which is within a reasonable range in the industry [3].

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On January 9, 2026, just one month after the establishment of the “polysilicon storage and integration platform”, six leading silicon material enterprises including Tongwei Group, GCL Technology, Daquan New Energy, Xinte Energy, Asia Silicon, and East Hope were summoned for a regulatory interview by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) [10][11].

• Shall not make agreements on capacity, capacity utilization, production and sales volume, and sales prices
• Shall not conduct communication or coordination on information such as prices, costs, production and sales volumes
• The China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA) and relevant enterprises shall formulate rectification plans [10]

• Promoting polysilicon price increases and controlling production and sales volumes in the name of industry self-discipline is conducive to resolving overcapacity
• The platform adopts a dual-track model of “debt-assuming acquisition + flexible storage to reduce capacity”, which helps the orderly exit of backward capacity
• It can undertake potential debts of tens of billions of yuan, helping to resolve crises for banks and suppliers [3]

• Nominally adjusting capacity, but actually controlling production and sales volumes, dividing the market according to capital contribution ratios, and squeezing the space for downstream enterprises
• There is great controversy among downstream enterprises, and poor price transmission will lead to continuous squeezing of downstream profits
• Contradictions between collaborative cooperation and independent competition have emerged within the industrial chain [10][11]

At the China Photovoltaic Industry Annual Conference held in December 2025, industry self-discipline entered phase 2.0, but divisions have emerged:

• The target price of CNY 70,000-80,000 per ton for silicon materials has caused dissatisfaction among downstream enterprises, which believe the industry will enter an era of “excessive profits”
• The production and price restriction schemes face difficulties in implementation, and it is rumored that some enterprises did not sign the agreement
• The fragility of industrial chain collaboration remains a key obstacle, and the root causes of mismatched capacity expansion between upstream and downstream and zero-sum games have not been eliminated [6][8]

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Adjustment Direction	Specific Measures	Representative Enterprises
Flexible Capacity	Production based on demand, dynamic balance, and flexible production arrangement based on cost advantages	Tongwei, GCL, Daquan
Refined Inventory Management	“Sell as much as possible” strategy to reduce price decline risks and maintain low inventory	Daquan, TBEA
Sustained Technology Investment	Maintain R&D investment and avoid relaxing innovation efforts after getting out of losses	Entire Industry

Wang Bohua, Honorary President of the China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA), pointed out that when the photovoltaic industry can completely emerge from the adjustment period depends on the implementation effectiveness of three key variables [8]:

The most critical variable affecting the direction of the photovoltaic industry in 2026 is whether enterprises can adhere to self-disciplinary production cuts, production based on sales, and not bid for orders at low prices to avoid a rebound of “involution”.

Enterprises in the industry need to continuously invest in R&D to optimize existing technologies, promote accurate matching of innovative achievements with market demand, and adapt to the trend of expanding peak-valley price differences in electricity after new energy is fully integrated into the market.

The operation effect of the polysilicon capacity integration and acquisition platform and the market-oriented mechanism for the exit of backward capacity will affect the efficiency of capacity clearing.

1. Short-term Strategy (First Half of 2026):
   Maintain flexible capacity arrangements, adjust operating rates in accordance with changes in market supply and demand, and avoid blind capacity expansion or reduction.

2. Medium-term Strategy (Second Half of 2026 to 2027):
   Pay attention to technological iteration opportunities and seek differentiated breakthroughs in technical routes such as HJT, TOPCon, and BC.

3. Long-term Strategy (2028 and Beyond):
   Build a global resilient supply chain, shift from product output to win-win value creation, and consolidate China’s global leading position in the photovoltaic industry.

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The anti-involution policies in the photovoltaic industry have evolved from policy guidance to industry self-discipline, and from platform construction to regulatory standardization. Major silicon material enterprises such as Tongwei and GCL have actively responded to the industry’s winter by participating in capacity integration platforms, signing self-discipline conventions, and adjusting capacity strategies. However, the regulatory interview by the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) in January 2026 indicates that industry self-discipline must be carried out within the framework of anti-monopoly, and monopoly practices shall not be conducted in the name of “anti-involution”.

In the future, the investment decisions of silicon material enterprises need to strike a balance between industry self-discipline and market competition, and make trade-offs between short-term profits and long-term development. Only by adhering to technological innovation, improving product quality, and building a healthy industrial chain ecosystem can the photovoltaic industry achieve truly high-quality development.

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[1] China Business Journal - Photovoltaic “Anti-Involution”: 2026 Enters the Critical Stage (https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202601033607643089.html)
[2] China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA) - Interpretation of Industry Self-Discipline and Capacity Regulation Policies
[3] Energy Finance - Can the Silicon Material Platform Lead the Photovoltaic Industry Out of “Involution”? (https://www.nationalee.com/newsinfo/8875357.html)
[4] Securities Times - New Progress in “Anti-Involution” in the Photovoltaic Industry (https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/3534416.html)
[5] Ferroalloy Online - Disclosure of Shareholder List of Polysilicon Platform Company
[6] Carbon Go Technology - Divisions Emerge in Photovoltaic Self-Discipline! The Era of Anti-Involution 2.0 (https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2025-12-22/doc-inhcsexf4597935.shtml)
[7] Huxiu - Ten “Killer Moves” to Break Photovoltaic Industry Involution (https://www.huxiu.com/article/4824465.html)
[8] China Financial Information Network - 2025 Photovoltaic Industry Critical Battle: From Price Competition to Value Reconstruction (https://finance.sina.com.cn/money/bond/2025-12-22/doc-inhcrpzq9384274.shtml)
[9] Listed Company Research - Investor Relations Records of TBEA and Daquan New Energy
[10] Cailianshe - Anti-Involution or Involvement in Monopoly? Leading Enterprises Are Required Not to Agree on Prices and Capacity When the Silicon Material “Storage Platform” Turns One Month Old (https://finance.eastmoney.com/a/202601093614117289.html)
[11] Sina Finance - Anti-Involution or Involvement in Monopoly? Leading Enterprises Are Required Not to Agree on Prices and Capacity (https://finance.sina.com.cn/jjxw/2026-01-09/doc-inhfssrr3026010.shtml)