Analysis of Kayou's IPO Bet Deadline and Valuation Restructuring in the Collectible Card Industry

China’s collectible card market is experiencing an unprecedented wave of capitalization. At the start of 2026, another card company launched a sprint for the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. On January 1, Suplay (Super Playka) submitted a prospectus to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, applying for a main board listing, aiming to become the “first stock of collectible cards”[1]. Founded in 2019, the company’s revenue exceeded RMB 280 million in the first nine months of 2025, with adjusted net profit reaching RMB 86.423 million, maintaining double-digit high-speed growth[1].

However, to date, no pure card company has successfully completed this listing path. Currently, listed companies in this field are mostly upstream suppliers or IP giants, such as Jinghua Laser, a supplier of Kayou, and Alpha Group, which has self-owned IP cards such as Armor Hero, with cards only being one of their business segments[1]. Even Kayou, the industry leader, saw its prospectus lapse for the second time a month ago, with only half a year left until the bet agreement deadline, and the industry is pessimistic about whether it can launch a third sprint before the bet takes effect[1].

From the perspective of competitive landscape, China’s card market has gradually evolved into a pattern of “one dominant player, multiple niche players”. Kayou occupies over 70% of the market share, monopolizing 71.1% of China’s trading card game (TCG) market, with its 2024 revenue surging to RMB 10.057 billion, even surpassing Lego to become the market share champion in the toy industry[2]. Besides Suplay, other players carry out differentiated competition based on different IP types, gameplay mechanisms, and crowd positioning: Jikashe (Card Collection Club) has steadily entered the market through a massive IP matrix; Shanhun (Flash Soul) has seized opportunities from popular game IPs and focuses on game IP-based card products; Hitcard targets the niche segment of film and television IPs[3].

Currently, there are two mainstream gameplay models for cards in the market[3]:

is highlighted by its strong competitive attributes: Players can build decks by combining cards, engage in battles, and manufacturers synchronously operate supporting tournaments to form a long-term ecosystem.

centers its core logic on “scarcity”: It enhances collection value through limited releases and graded designs (such as regular cards, rare cards, and hidden editions), with players’ core needs focusing on collection, exchange, and value preservation.

Founded in 2011, Kayou claims to focus on TCGs, but China’s domestic TCG ecosystem is not yet mature, with collection-based gameplay still being the mainstream, and it relies on blind box and card unboxing gameplay to stimulate consumer repurchases. Suplay, on the other hand, focuses more on China’s collectible non-competitive card market dominated by “transparent cards”. According to Frost & Sullivan, it ranks first in this niche market in terms of 2024 GMV[3].

In October 2025, a silent announcement from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange put an end to Kayou’s second listing sprint—only six months after it re-submitted its prospectus on April 14, the document lapsed again, making it a rare case of “two consecutive failures” in the Hong Kong stock market[2]. This giant, which conquered primary school students with Ultraman cards and saw its 2024 revenue surge to RMB 10.057 billion, has repeatedly hit a wall in the capital market.

Kayou’s dilemma is essentially a divergence between “short-term huge profits” and “long-term value”. It rose rapidly through the “blind box + minors” model, earning tens of billions in revenue, but this model has not only crossed regulatory red lines but also violated public order and good morals, making it unsustainable in the long run[2]. From the perspective of IPO review, the core concerns of regulators include:

First, its high profits rely on harvesting irrational consumption from minors; as regulation tightens, this part of revenue will inevitably shrink significantly. Second, the risk of IP authorization expiration makes future revenue growth full of uncertainty, making it difficult for institutions to conduct long-term valuation. Third, the founder’s sky-high salary and family-style governance make capital worried about their interests being encroached upon[2].

Even more eye-catching is the countdown. The bet agreement between Kayou, Sequoia China, and Tencent clearly stipulates that Kayou must complete its IPO by June 2026; otherwise, it must repurchase shares worth USD 135 million “with principal and interest”, plus pay an annual interest rate of 8%, resulting in compensation alone exceeding RMB 1.3 billion[2].

With only about 7 months left until the bet expires, Kayou’s listing sprint has entered the “countdown stage”[2]. However, both the reality of the second IPO lapse and the inherent flaws in its business model indicate that the outcome of this bet is already predetermined—listing has never been a “panacea” for Kayou; its real problem lies in the fatal flaws in the underlying logic of building its business empire[2].

More rational institutions have already started “voting with their feet”. Although Sequoia China and Tencent are investors in Kayou, after the second IPO lapse, they did not push for an immediate third submission, but instead remained silent—clearly, they also know that against the backdrop of unresolved compliance issues and a deteriorating industry environment, a third submission will most likely be in vain[2]. Northbound capital took no action during Kayou’s second submission, with no signs of increase in holdings, indicating that foreign capital also holds a wait-and-see attitude towards this “billion-yuan track leader”[2].

A brokerage research report bluntly states: “Kayou’s core problem is not a lack of funds (its cash and cash equivalents reached RMB 4.879 billion at the end of 2024), but a lack of a sustainable business model recognized by the capital market. The expiration of the bet is just a catalyst; even if it can barely list through rectification, it will be difficult to obtain a high valuation, and it may even face the embarrassment of a broken stock price after listing.”[2]

Kayou’s billion-yuan revenue has always been tainted with a “gray filter”[2]. On the surface, it is a dark horse in the pan-entertainment industry, topping the industry with annual sales of 4.8 billion card boxes; but beneath the glossy performance, it relies excessively on minors and has a “gambling-like” business model that runs counter to regulatory orientation—this is the core reason for its two failed IPO attempts, and it is an even more fatal hidden danger than the pressure of the bet agreement[2].

Prospectus data shows that 90% of its core consumer group is under 15 years old; among the 4.8 billion card packs sold in 2024, 4.32 billion were purchased by primary school students, with an average annual consumption of 40.8 packs per primary school student[2]. Kayou cannot shake off or avoid the label of “Primary School Student Harvester”.

Although the State Administration for Market Regulation issued the Guidelines for Regulating Blind Box Business Operations in 2023, which prohibits the sale of blind boxes to children under 8 years old, and Kayou has also released the Sunlight Pact to restrict minor consumption, its business model still cannot completely escape regulatory scrutiny[3]. For Kayou, it not only faces regulatory pressure but also the time urgency of the bet agreement: it must list before June 2026, otherwise it will have to pay more than RMB 1.3 billion in repurchase funds plus an annual interest rate of 8% to investors such as Sequoia and Tencent[3].

Suplay’s origin is a story about channels and platforms. In 2019, Huang Wanjun, a former analyst at China Renaissance and COO of Modian.com, identified a pain point: blind box players who got unwanted styles wanted to resell them, but there was no efficient, vertical channel. Therefore, he founded Suplay and launched a blind box vending mini-program, which was essentially an intermediary[4].

The turning point was 2021. That year, Suplay accomplished two major things: first, it secured a US$10 million Series A+ financing led by game giant miHoYo; second, it acquired Heyfen (Hey Powder), a designer and manufacturer of trendy toys[4]. miHoYo brought not only financial support but also a key IP entry ticket—the right to develop derivatives of top-tier game IPs such as Genshin Impact and Honkai: Star Rail[4].

The acquisition of Heyfen allowed Suplay to transform from a “light-asset platform” to a “heavy-asset brand”, gaining control over upstream production and design. Also in that year, Suplay launched its self-owned card brand “Kakawow”. Initially, this might have only been a supplement to its trendy toy ecosystem, but the market responded far more enthusiastically than expected[4].

Data in the prospectus reveals the intensity of this transformation: in 2023, the company’s revenue from collectibles (mainly cards) accounted for only 32.9%, while consumer-grade products (such as trendy toys) accounted for 67.1%; by the first three quarters of 2025, the situation had completely reversed—card revenue soared to 70.0%, while trendy toys shrank to 30.0%[4]. Before anyone knew it, Huang Wanjun led the company from the fiercely competitive red ocean of hand-made figures, from a platform, to a card publisher. There was only one core driver for this transformation: the card business is extremely profitable[4].

The most notable point in Suplay’s prospectus is the sharp decline in the proportion of revenue from self-owned IPs. Data shows that the contribution rate of self-owned IPs to the company’s revenue has plummeted from 40.6% to 4.1% over the past three years, while the revenue share of the top five authorized IPs has increased from 47.8% to 77.7%[1].

This change reflects that Suplay’s high dependence on external IPs has reached a dangerous level. Even more dangerously, the prospectus admits that the IP authorization agreement that contributed the most revenue has expired and is currently under “friendly negotiation”—data shows that this IP contributed 32.3% of revenue in the first three quarters of 2025[4]. If renewal fails or terms worsen, Suplay’s revenue will face a cliff-like drop.

Currently, the essence of Suplay’s business is still a “high-level foundry” with excellent operational capabilities, earning operational premiums rather than brand premiums: it is good at converting top-tier IPs into exquisite products and stimulating consumption through marketing and community operations, but it has failed to control the most core asset—IP[4]. In this model, if it loses authorization for a popular IP or competitors obtain the same authorization, its business model will suffer a major impact.

Despite structural risks, Suplay’s financial data is still impressive. Looking through the prospectus, it can be seen that the card business has become a dual engine for revenue and profit in Suplay’s business machine[4]:

From 2023 to the first three quarters of 2025, Suplay’s revenue from collectibles was RMB 47.946 million, RMB 117 million, and RMB 198 million respectively, with year-on-year growth of over 140% and 130% in 2024 and the first three quarters of 2025[4]. Overall, the company achieved revenue of RMB 283 million and adjusted net profit of RMB 86.423 million in the first three quarters of 2025[1].

However, this high growth is based on a high dependence on external IP authorizations. In 2025, Suplay is fully betting on external IP authorizations, and its performance will be directly affected by IP selection. Misjudgment of hot trends, unsmooth authorization negotiations, or slower speed than peers will lead to a chain reaction[1].

Collectible cards were once a small but niche interest circle; it only took three to five years for them to expand rapidly to the billion-yuan scale by riding the wave of the “guzi” fandom merchandise economy[1]. However, as the industry scale expands and capital enters in batches, regulatory attention has been continuously increasing.

A long-term hidden concern for the card industry is that the blind box card-drawing mechanism and youth consumption expose the card business model to dual pressure from regulation and public opinion[1]. Many external analyses believe this is a major reason for Kayou’s two failed IPO attempts.

In response, Suplay has honestly listed risks that may be brought about by changes in regulatory policies in its prospectus, including increased compliance costs, approval delays, restricted marketing and promotion, and even adjustments to the business model itself[1]. The company has put forward statistical data that over 99% of its customers are adults, trying to alleviate regulatory concerns[1].

Compared with mature foreign markets, China still lacks authoritative card rating agencies and truly vertical and mature secondary trading platforms, which are crucial for the stability of card collection value and the long-term healthy development of the market[1].

With high dependence on IPs, card companies are caught in a cycle of competition over authorization, art design, quality control, and prices. Once a hot trend emerges, homogeneous competition among peers is inevitable. For example, in early 2025, both Kayou and Jikashe launched Ne Zha 2 card packs; both were officially authorized, their release dates overlapped, and even the same artwork was used[1].

Whether expanding IPs, increasing investment in design, or upgrading craftsmanship, all require substantial financial support, which is why both Kayou and Suplay are urgently seeking listing and financing. However, as the “guzi” fandom merchandise economy recedes, the bubble in the card market will also dissipate. If a sound market system and business logic cannot be established, diversified groups can still divest their card businesses and exit, while pure card companies will face a dilemma where one loss leads to overall losses[1].

The capital market’s valuation of card companies is undergoing profound adjustments. Although Kayou’s valuation was once predicted to exceed RMB 100 billion, the actual PS (price-to-sales) multiple given by the market is only 8-10 times, far lower than Pop Mart’s 19 times[2]. This valuation differentiation reflects the market’s completely different judgments on the two business models.

There are multiple reasons for Kayou’s low valuation: first, its business model is highly dependent on minors, and this group faces the risk of revenue shrinkage against the backdrop of tightened regulation. Second, the non-exclusivity and short-term nature of IP authorizations make future revenue full of uncertainty. Third, the family-style governance structure makes institutional investors worried about the company’s governance level[2].

In contrast, although Suplay is smaller in scale, its positioning focusing on the high-end adult collection market may earn it a higher valuation multiple. However, its structural issue of self-owned IP accounting for only 4% of revenue also makes investors skeptical about its long-term value.

The valuation logic of the card industry is shifting from chasing scale to scrutinizing value creation capabilities. For Kayou, although its annual revenue of tens of billions and gross profit margin of 71.3% are impressive, the sustainability of its profit model is widely questioned[2]. For Suplay, although its growth curve is steep, its business model highly dependent on external authorized IPs is also fragile.

The real suspense is not which of these players will ring the listing bell first, but who can create long-term value[3]. Kayou’s story has sounded an alarm for the entire trendy toy card-unboxing industry: short-term huge profits relying on a “gambling-like” model and a single group will eventually be eliminated by regulation and the market; only by building a moat centered on self-owned IPs and balancing commercial profits with social responsibilities, like Pop Mart, can a company gain long-term recognition from the capital market[2].

With tightened regulation and increased requirements for industry standardization, the valuation framework for card companies is undergoing the following restructuring:

Institutional investors are starting to pay more attention to the sustainability of gross profit margins, the health of revenue structure, and the compliance of profit models, rather than simply pursuing revenue growth rates.

The value of self-owned IPs is given higher weight, and the degree of dependence on authorized IPs has become an important risk indicator. The change in Suplay’s self-owned IP revenue share from 40.6% to 4.1% is not just a financial figure, but a warning signal for its long-term competitiveness.

The proportion of minor users has become an important consideration in regulatory review and valuation pricing. Kayou’s data that 90% of its users are under 15 years old has led to fundamental questioning of its business model.

Governance factors such as family-style governance and transparency of information disclosure are increasing in weight in IPO reviews.

The collectible card industry is at a critical turning point. On one hand, the rise of the “guzi” fandom merchandise economy has driven rapid expansion of the industry and batch capitalization. On the other hand, tightened regulation and intensified market competition are accelerating industry reshuffling.

The value of pure card players is mainly reflected in authorization, design, and quality control; their business structure is single, easy to be imitated and diluted, and vulnerable to dimensionality reduction attacks from IP owners, platforms, and even upstream supply chains[1]. To diversify risks, Kayou is expanding into diversified businesses such as plush trendy toys; Jiasen Entertainment, the parent company of Jikashe, has also launched the Senluo Wanxiang (Myriads of Phenomena) fandom merchandise brand. In contrast, Suplay is going against the trend, going all-in on the card track, with the proportion of card business surging from 32.9% to 70% in less than three years[1]. The effectiveness of this radical strategy of deep binding to the card track remains to be seen.

For Kayou, the 7-month countdown to the bet agreement is less of a final deadline for the listing sprint and more of a final window for business model transformation[2]. However, judging from its current performance, this transformation will most likely end in failure—after all, a business empire supported by minors can never withstand the test of transparency, let alone the rational scrutiny of the capital market[2].

Failure of the bet may instead be an opportunity to “stop losses”: Kayou must completely abandon the profit logic of “harvesting minors”, either increase investment in self-owned IP research and development, or shift to adult consumer groups, and restructure its business model within a compliant framework[2]. However, judging from its IPO fundraising plan, where 45% is used for production expansion rather than IP R&D or compliance rectification, it is still obsessed with short-term scale expansion rather than solving core problems[2].

Based on the above analysis, when evaluating the investment value of card companies, investors should focus on the following risk factors:

Policy uncertainties faced by the blind box card-drawing mechanism and minor consumption may have a fundamental impact on the business model.

The non-exclusivity and short-term nature of authorized IPs make revenue growth highly dependent on the results of authorization negotiations. Suplay’s structural weakness of self-owned IP accounting for only 4% of revenue represents a common dilemma faced by the industry.

Intensified homogeneous competition may lead to a decline in gross profit margins and loss of market share. Competition for top-tier IP authorizations will become increasingly fierce, and authorization costs may rise.

Against the backdrop of the receding “guzi” fandom merchandise economy, the valuation bubble in the card market may burst. Historical experience shows that emotional consumption is highly volatile; the sharp drop in secondary market prices of trendy toy IPs such as Labubu has provided a lesson[3].

Family-style governance structure and information opacity may affect the protection of investors’ interests.

Kayou’s IPO bet countdown and Suplay’s sprint for a Hong Kong listing reflect the deep-seated dilemmas faced by China’s collectible card industry on its capitalization path. Kayou rose rapidly through the “blind box + minors” model, but this model has not only crossed regulatory red lines but also violated public order and good morals, making its two failed IPO attempts no accident. Although Suplay’s growth is impressive, its structural weakness of self-owned IP accounting for only 4% of revenue also casts doubt on its long-term value.

The valuation logic of the collectible card industry is undergoing profound reshaping: from chasing scale to scrutinizing value creation, from growth-oriented to profit quality-oriented, from focusing on short-term performance to evaluating long-term sustainability. Against the backdrop of tightened regulation and industry standardization, only companies that can build a business model centered on self-owned IPs, based on compliant operations, and supported by adult consumer groups can truly win long-term recognition from the capital market.

For Kayou, the 7-month countdown to the bet agreement is both