Risk Analysis Report on the Non-Performing Loan Ratio of Huishang Bank's Real Estate Segment
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According to the data I collected, Huishang Bank’s real estate NPL ratio indeed surged from 1.08% at the end of 2024 to 3.12% in the first half of 2025 within six months, an increase of nearly threefold [0]. This sharp change reflects severe risk challenges faced by the bank in the real estate credit sector. The following is a systematic analysis from multiple dimensions, along with risk control strategy recommendations.
The sharp surge in Huishang Bank’s real estate NPL ratio in a short period is the result of the superposition of multiple factors. From a macro perspective, the real estate market has continued to adjust since 2024, with some real estate enterprises facing tight cash flow and frequent debt defaults, which has directly transmitted to the quality of the bank’s credit assets [0]. From a meso perspective, although Anhui Province’s economic fundamentals are relatively stable, overcapacity in traditional industries still exists, and upstream and downstream enterprises relying on these industries have been greatly impacted [0]. From a micro perspective, affected by the slow macroeconomic recovery and fluctuations in the real estate market in 2024, some small and medium-sized clients of Huishang Bank in the manufacturing and transportation industries faced increased operational difficulties, coupled with reduced income of individual clients leading to a significant decline in their repayment ability [0].
As of the end of 2024, the combined proportion of Huishang Bank’s loans to the construction industry, real estate industry, and personal housing mortgages reached 21.03%, representing a large exposure to real estate-related sectors [0]. In terms of loan industry distribution, the bank’s loans are mainly concentrated in public utilities, commerce and services, and manufacturing, accounting for 22.60%, 12.46%, and 12.36% of the total loans respectively [0]. This relatively concentrated credit structure has amplified risk exposure during the downward cycle of the real estate market.
It is worth noting that Huishang Bank has certain deficiencies in risk management and internal control. According to regulatory penalties in 2024, the Hefei Ningguo Road Branch was fined 5.5 million yuan, the highest annual fine, for deficiencies in the full-process management of working capital loans; the Ningbo Branch was fined 2.6 million yuan for six credit violations; and the Head Office was fined 3.95 million yuan for systemic deficiencies such as imprudent interbank credit management and distorted data in the EAST system [0]. These internal control issues are somewhat related to the surge in real estate NPL ratio.
Huishang Bank has implemented a number of risk control measures: At the organizational structure level, all real estate development loans have been transferred to the Head Office for approval, and a name-list-based access system has been implemented for developers [0]. At the collateral management level, pledged and hypothecated loans account for 37.48%, with the main collaterals being real estate and land, and the maximum loan-to-value ratio does not exceed 70% [0]. At the risk resolution level, the bank disposed of a total of 15.881 billion yuan of non-performing loans in 2024, including 6.240 billion yuan in cash collection and 6.816 billion yuan in write-offs [0]. These measures have contained the spread of risks to a certain extent.
However, the current measures still have obvious shortcomings. First, the risk early warning mechanism lacks forward-looking capabilities and failed to effectively predict systemic risks in the real estate industry. Second, the implementation of the name-list-based management needs to be strengthened, as some high-risk real estate enterprises may still be on the credit approval list. Third, there are weak links in post-loan management, and the monitoring of credit fund flows is not timely enough. Fourth, the construction of internal control and compliance culture needs to be further strengthened, and repeated regulatory penalties reflect that awareness of compliance needs to be improved.
Huishang Bank should closely follow the latest policy requirements of regulators on real estate loans, and strictly implement regulatory indicators such as the real estate loan concentration management system and the upper limit of personal housing loan proportion [0]. During the risk resolution process, proactively communicate and align with financial regulators to seek regulatory policy support and a time window for risk disposal.
Proactively participate in seminars and experience exchanges on real estate risk resolution organized by banking associations, financial institutions, and other organizations, and learn from advanced practices of peer institutions in real estate loan risk control. At the same time, cooperate with local governments to do a good job in ensuring housing delivery and risk resolution of real estate enterprises, while fulfilling social responsibilities and safeguarding the bank’s creditor’s rights and interests.
The surge in Huishang Bank’s real estate NPL ratio from 1.08% to 3.12% reflects severe challenges faced by the bank in the real estate credit sector, while also exposing deficiencies in its risk management and internal control. Facing this situation, Huishang Bank needs to adopt systematic measures from multiple dimensions such as source control, process management, asset disposal, governance optimization, and risk mitigation to form a complete closed loop of risk prevention and control.
From a positive perspective, Huishang Bank’s overall asset quality remains relatively stable, with an NPL ratio of only 1.49% as of the end of 2024, which is significantly better than the industry average; the provision coverage ratio reaches 276.57%, with strong risk mitigation capabilities [0]. The bank has established a relatively sound risk management system framework and is promoting digital transformation of risk control. As long as it can face up to the problems and implement precise measures, it is expected to gradually resolve real estate loan risks and achieve stabilization and recovery of asset quality.
In the future, Huishang Bank should adhere to the general tone of “seeking progress while maintaining stability” in risk management, and while effectively preventing and resolving real estate loan risks, continue to optimize the credit structure, enhance the ability to serve the real economy, and embark on a development path where high-quality development and high-level security complement each other.
[0] 2025 Annual Tracking Rating Report of Huishang Bank Co., Ltd. (http://qxb-pdf-osscache.qixin.com/AnBaseinfo/92505e5dd1256b75d4790545bff6cf4f.pdf)
[1] 2024 Annual Report of Huishang Bank Co., Ltd. (https://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2025/0327/2025032701880_c.pdf)
[2] Twenty Years of Glory Reflecting the Yangtze-Huaihe Region, Financial Original Aspiration Forging Brilliance — A Glimpse of Huishang Bank’s Development on its 20th Anniversary (http://www.ah.xinhuanet.com/20251228/3aa9bc3a84f94f30bfdd2a2d6074473d/c.html)
[3] Shocking! Huishang Bank Sells 820 Million Yuan of Real Estate in Beijing, Vanke is Actually the Fifth Largest Shareholder (https://eu.36kr.com/zh/p/3321997728164102)
Insights are generated using AI models and historical data for informational purposes only. They do not constitute investment advice or recommendations. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
About us: Ginlix AI is the AI Investment Copilot powered by real data, bridging advanced AI with professional financial databases to provide verifiable, truth-based answers. Please use the chat box below to ask any financial question.
